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Abstract 
In general, lattice theory has helped to simplify, unify and generalize many aspects of math- 
ematics, and it has suggested many interesting new problems. In an era of ever-increasing pro- 
liferatlon of scientific results, its relative simplicity and unifying influence are certainly healthy 
and refreshing. (Birkhoff [4, p. I]) 
Diagrams prove nothing, but bring outstanding features readily to the eye; they are therefore 
no substitute for such critical tests as may be applied to the data, but are valuable in suggesting 
such tests, and explaining the conclusions founded upon them. (Fisher [16, p. 241) 
Quel que soit le point de d&part de I’activitk scientifique, cette activitk ne peut pleinement 
convaincre qu’en quittant le domaine de base: si elle exptrimente. il faut raisonner; si elle 
raisonne, il faut expkrimenter. (Bachelard [41. p. 31) ’ (1) @ 1999-Published by Elsevier 
Science B.V. All rights reserved 
Ke,,1vords; Galois lattices; Dualities; Data analysis 
1. Introduction 
A quarter of a century after the ebbing of the structural& wave, which had reached 
many a scientific methodology before it departed, leaving in its wake a vanishing of 
formalized models, a new interest is emerging in latticial and other ordinal structures 
because of their ability to encode any kind of duality, in experimental as well as 
observational data. While my claim is not a complete novelty (see [I, l&20,38,49] 
and some personal contributions numbered [55-661 in references), it has nonetheless 
been bolstered by the ongoing development. since 1983, of the computer program 
GLAD (General Lattice Analysis and Design, see [66]). What I propose here is a kind 
of rehabilitation thesis, since from its birth as an autonomous mathematical topic during 
the thirties, Lutti~ Thmry received enthusiastic reactions. Long before the revival of 
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Galois Lattices in the sixties, a French philosopher of Mathematics as A. Lautman 
immediately recognized the interest of lattices within the scope of Mathematics and 
methodology of sciences, for encoding dualities: 
S’inspirant de Dedekind, un grand nombre de chercheurs contemporains parmi 
lesquels MM. Birkhoff, von Neumann, Glivenko, Ore et d’autres ont construit une 
theorie g&n&ale des structures (les auteurs anglais disent lattices, reseaux) qui 
englobe la thtorie des ensembles, la theorie des nombres, la geometric projective, 
la topologie combinatoire, la theorie des probabilites, la logique mathbmatique, 
la theorie des espaces fonctionnels, etc.. . (. . .) La thtorie gtnkale des structures 
repose done sur la possibilite de structurer de deux facons inverses I’une de l’autre 
un meme ensemble, et c’est pour nous un resultat d’une importance philosophique 
capitale de voir cette dualitt interne de deux etres antisymetriques, distinguables 
au sein d’un meme ttre, former le principe generateur d’une immense moisson de 
realite mathematique. (Lautman [49, p. 2491 (2) 
This peculiar welcome was reinforced by the existence, in these days, of a very ac- 
tive French lattice school around the work of Dubreil [12], Dubreil-Jacotin et al. [ 141 on 
geometric lattices, the papers by Riguet 1948 on binary relations, and Schiitzenberger 
[31]. Later, however, local reactions became more ambivalent. Although he wrote an 
enthusiastic foreword for a new edition of Lautman’s work, J. Dieudonne was not as 
gentle or polite for the two Lattice Theory pioneers: 
11 semble par contre que les auteurs auraient pu sans inconvenient omettre le 
chapitre sur les lattices, auxquels toute une tcole amtricaine voue une predilection 
persistante, malgre le peu d’interet que presente cette theorie dans les autres bran- 
ches des mathematiques. (Dieudonnt in Mac Lane et Birkhoff [26, p. XIV] (3) 
In the retrospect, how should we interpret such a judgement? Was it a settling of 
a scores within the mathematical gotha? A struggle for self-promotion between sub- 
topics? As compared with this kind of evaluation and exclusion, we will be more 
inspired here by the wisdom of another quotation recommending more open- 
mindedness: 
What’s next? (. . .) In the foreseeable future, discrete mathematics will be an in- 
creasingly useful tool in the attempt to understand the world and (. . .) analysis 
will therefore play a proportionally smaller role. (. . .) So, after all that has been 
said, what’s the conclusion? Perhaps in a single word taste. (Halmos [23]) 
To come back more directly to our present claim, any lattice is a partial order 
equipped with two algebraic operations: join (upper bound) and meet(lower bound), 
which bear its semantical interpretations. Even in everyday life it is, for example, 
common to scan through power sets ordered by inclusion, of which the two operations 
are union and intersection, and which are the regular nightly tools of the gambler, 
experimenter, probabilist (lattice of events), and the logician (lattices of propositions), 
or the classifier (calculus of classes), since they, often implicitly, structure human 
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activities. (i.e. Boolean lattices), other lattices have their own semantics and operations 
with their own specific structure and properties. They can be as “natural” yet, while 
being more “arbitrary” and less “regular”. Thus, taking Duta Analysis in a broad sense, 
the claim can be rephrased as: “Lattices are natural und basic structures for describing 
dutu, which can bear both thought, und calculus”. This argument will be developed 
throughout the text by following a semi-chronological/thematic approach. 
Instead of entering into technicalities, for which the reader is referred to the con- 
tributions [55-661, it will be more informative and hopefully more interesting to ques- 
tion the underlying methodological options. Hence, throughout the text, these personal 
contributions will be matched and put in comparison with some quotations which 
inspired them, from diverse authors either in Mathematics or in the Philosophy of 
Science. 
2. Lattices on experimental designs 
The first non-premeditated encountering between lattices and observational structures 
dates back to the constitution of Lattice Theory, via Logic and Geometry: 
11 semble a premiere vue que l’objet du calcul des propositions et celui de la 
geometric projective soient differents, et pourtant la structure logique de ces deux 
disciplines presente (. . .) bien des analogies. La raison de cette analogie n’est 
apparue que dans des recherches toutes recentes dans la domaine de ce qu’on 
appelle l’algebre abstraite. (Lautman [49, p. 2491) (4) 
The original motivation came in 1936 in a pioneering paper by G. Birkhoff and J. von 
Neumann [5], who were attempting to formalize The Logic of Quantum Mechanics: 
The object of the present paper is to discover what logical structure one may 
hope to find in physical theories which, like quantum mechanics, do not conform 
to classical logic. Our main conclusion, based on admittedly heuristic arguments, 
is that one can reasonably expect to find a calculus of propositions which is for- 
mally indistinguishable from the calculus of linear subspaces with respect to set 
products, linear sums, and orthogonal complements - and resembles the usual cal- 
culus of propositions with respect to and, or, and not. (Birkhoff and Von Neumann 
15, P. 8231) 
The point which corresponds to our present purposes is that the same family of 
modular lattices happens to underlay the construction of experimental designs, and this 
is not because of some constraint of the observational space, as in Quantum Physics, 
but from the a priori requirement to analyse the observations in good conditions of 
statistical decomposition (uniqueness, independence of the statistic definitions, see [25]. 
Fig. 1 summarizes the content of [56], which may be stated as follows: the most 
general experimental designs for which the standard AN0 VA decomposition is complete 
and orthogonal belongs to the class of permuting sublattices of partitions (on the 
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Latin square on 
Gluing decomposition in atomic blocks 
Fig. 1. Permuting designs 
data set) which moreover satisfy a condition of local orthogonality (two partitions 
are permuting if locally crossed in disjoint blocks, and locally orthogonal if the usual 
Fisher’s condition on cardinalities is satisfied in each block). Here we come across 
the permuting partition lattices, a well-known algebraic structure since the early work 
by Dubreil and Dubreil-Jacotin [13] to formalize decomposition theorems of algebras, 
showing that they are modular, which was then extended in a celebrated paper by 
Ore [28], up to, more currently Jonsson [24], and the characterisation of distributive 
permuting lattices by Draskovicova [ 1 l] (see also [55,58]). 
Fig. 1 displays the modular lattice generated by such a design, encountered in Psy- 
chology (see [56,61]), which can be seen (bottom drawing) as the amalgamation of 
two sub-structures which correspond to two independent experimental constraints and 
are constructed - in statistical terms - out of “Latin squares with repetitions”. It is 
very clear that no experimenter can master this kind of construction in terms of “n-ury 
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tables” as it can be done for trivial examples: lattices and theorems are required for un- 
derstanding the design structure, process of generation, and analysis. The top drawing 
displays the ungluing decomposition of the lattice in maximal atomistic blocks, thus 
illustrating a classic theorem by Birkhoff (a kind of decomposition that has been gener- 
alized to other lattices by Herrmann, Chajda, Wille and others, by using some folerm~c 
relations). In particular, this decomposition points out the location of the irredwihlr 
inter&s which come from the amalgamation of simpler ones (Latin squares). 
Then, by using Miibius inversion (see [30]) and the characterization of the Mobius 
functions of modular lattices (see [8]), the statistical terms (sum of squares, decqrees of 
freedom.. .) can be calculated by recursion first, and second expressed by a Iunguuyc 
of’ ,formulu which makes them understandable locally, without requiring the global 
structure to decipher their meaning. In the general case where several Latin squares 
are umul~amuted in an experiment ~ as in Fig. 1 -, these lattices can become ex- 
tremely complex. Otherwise, in the distributive case for example, structural properties 
_ namely Birkhoff’s theorem matching distributive lattices and partial orders, and nice 
herediturJ properties of permutability (see [15,55]) - make them easily generated. 
and manageable in good conditions. Hence, the comer stone is the presence of Latin 
squares and other confusion structures in a design, which R.A. Fisher justified in his 
book devoted to The Designs qf’ Experiments as follows: 
If large quantities of material are needed, or large numbers of laboratory animals, 
these will almost invariably be more heterogeneous than smaller lots could be 
made to be. In like manner, extensive compilations of statistical material often 
show evidence of such heterogeneity among the several parts which have been 
assembled, and are seriously injured in value if this heterogeneity is overlooked 
in making the compilation. (. . .) In such cases we may usefully adopt the artifice 
known as confounding. (Fisher [17, p. 1071) 
The constraints generating confoundings lead to an abstract complexity that is managed 
by permuting lattices, which in turn secure simple and recursive analysis: 
As Tjur [34] and Duquenne [56] have shown, variance models based on [locally- 
orthogonal designs] have a straightforward analysis of variance, which parallel 
much of the present paper. (. . .) The coefficients can be easily calculated re- 
cursively, using the semilattice, whereas there is no such simple method for 
calculating those coefficients for a general association scheme. (Bailey in Speed 
[32, p. 9141) 
In a paper parallel to [55,56], . . and following a more statistical line, T. Tjur expressed 
precisely how - for this class of locally orthogonal designs - linear aspects and matrix 
calculus are secondary and displaced by more structural problems: 
This paper deals with analysis of variance (ANOVA) models in experimental de- 
signs where all factors (treatment factors as well as blocking) are orthogonal. 
(. .) Mathematically, this is a rather exclusive class of experimental designs. 
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Statistically, however, it is very important, and more or less standardized methods 
for the handling of analysis of variance models in such designs are given by most 
books on experimental design. (. . .) The main tool of the modern approach to 
analysis of variance is matrix calculus based on the concepts from Euclidean ge- 
ometry (orthogonal projections, etc.). However, in the case of orthogonal designs 
it is generally recognized that the matrix calculations involved are purely formal, 
in the sense that the interpretation of the symbols as matrices plays a secondary 
role. The final results (e.g. formulae for sums of squares of deviation) are not 
stated in terms of matrices anyway, and the intermediate matrix manipulations 
can be more or less replaced by similar operations on other algebraic objects, like 
symbolic expressions . (Tjur [34, p. 331) 
After the announcement of the pending achievement of a general classification of 
permuting designs [56], an event disrupted the project when Jonsson’s [24] long-stan- 
ding conjecture on the assimilation of permuting to Arguesian lattices was 
invalidated: 
A lattice L is linear if it is representable by commuting [permutable] equivalence 
relations. Jonsson showed that any such lattice is Arguesian. Numerous equivalent 
forms of the Arguesian law are now known; it is a strong condition with impor- 
tant applications in coordinatization theory. Nevertheless, the question raised by 
Jonsson, whether every Arguesian lattice is linear, has remained open until now. 
(. . .) The results of Section 3 imply that no finite set of identities (. . .) can 
completely characterize linearity; in particular, the Arguesian law is insufficient. 
(Haiman [22, pp. 121-1231) 
If the invalidation of Jonsson’s conjecture was in some sense disappointing for the 
community working on lattice decomposition, the consequences in terms of designs 
are not so terrible: it remains possible to focus on sub-classes which are manageable 
(see [58,61]), and to graft on these designs a few exotic sub-structures that do not 
make them explode. In particular, in the distributive case, as illustrated in Fig. 2, 
a Theorem gives an efficient test for checking whether a design is permuting, and 
several generation processes by free construction and amalgamation are provided as 
good candidates to formalize naturally how an experimenter can conceive a design, by 
bringing together local constraints. For instance, the bottom drawing of Fig. 2 illustrates 
how this example of the statistical literature was actually generated by subdirect product 
of two components, describing respectively the tools T and their relation with the 
machinists M within the factories F. 
To confront the dilemna that locally orthogonal designs constitute a nice class, sta- 
tistically “straightforward” (Bailey in [32]) but somehow algebraically untractable in 
the general permuting class without other restriction, a statistician feeling annoyed by 
the absence of more solid mathematical protections for building designs, could still 
follow one of the following pieces of advice: the first one is given by two experts in 







Kin3 of rest 
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Fig. 2. Distributive permuting designs 
experimental designs, the second recommendation, more ambitious, expresses a need 
to proceed with the formalization of new classes: 
Participation in the initial stages of experiments in different areas of research leads 
to a strong conviction that too little time and effort is put into the planning of 
experiment. The statistician who expects that his contribution to the planning will 
involve some technical matter in statistical theory finds repeatedly that he makes 
a much more valuable contribution simply by getting the investigator to explain 
clearly why he is doing the experiment, to justify the experimental treatments 
whose effects he proposes to compare, and to defend his claim that the completed 
experiment will enable its objectives to be realized. (Cochran and Cox [6, p. IO]) 
Further investigation in this area seems needed. The names of the designs do not 
matter: what is required is to identify the right class of design. By right I mean: 
(i) capable of being meaningful in relation to real treatments, (ii) capable of being 
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simply described to a computer, (iii) permitting enough theory to be developed 
about the whole class that both design and analysis can be simplified. Although 
the literature on design is so vast, very little of it satisfies all three criteria. (Bailey 
in Tjur [34, p. 731) 
3. GLAD: general lattice analysis and design 
To be in a better position to construct, decompose, and draw . . . finite lattices coming 
from experimental designs, from mathematical problems, as well as from the analysis 
of binary relations generated by observational data, the computer program GLAD has 
been developed, since 1983. The manual defining its commands has been described at 
length in [66], to which the interested reader is referred, and the contributions [59-661 
make use of its possibilities. Fig. 3 lists some global descriptions of the commands and 
illustrates two typical outputs. To comment upon them more precisely, let us shortly 
recall the two fundamental dualities on which the program is built: 
Luttices as conceptual models: first, lattices can be useful for unfolding binary re- 
lations (dichotomic data, represented by Ol-matrices) into the set of their maximal 
blocks (filled with 1 in the matrix), and in so doing give a frame for formalizing 
the duality extensionlintension of concepts. Historically, as said before, the ability to 
represent any kind of duality through lattices had been pointed out and stressed by 
Lautman [49] in the context of Philosophy of Mathematics. From a technical view- 
point, the underlying mathematical structures have been well known since Birkhoff [3] 
and the recognition of their potential usefulness in Data Analysis was stressed by Bar- 
but and Monjardet [1] which has been followed by technical developments in [38] and 
in the contributions [57,66]. A lattice is a partial order in which every pair of element 
(x, y) has a meet denoted by x A y, and dually a join x V y. Remarkable elements can 
be distinguished, among which the meet-and join-irreducible elements, which respec- 
tively have a unique upper cover and a unique lower cover, and generate the lattice 
downwards, and upwards. For a lattice L, let J(L) and &I(L) be its sets of join and 
meet-irreducible elements, and for an element x of L let denote by J, the subset of 
join-irreducible elements below X, and let M,, dually, be the set of meet-irreducibles 
above X. A fundamental if obvious remark is that: 
the higher is x, the larger is J,, while M, is smaller, 
a mechanism that can directly handle the duality extensionslintensions, as it has been 
described from Aristotle up to the more precise formulation in the Port Royal Logic 
by Arnault and Nicole, in the 17th century, which already stressed the fact that the 
more a concept’s intension grows, the smaller its extension must be, and conversely. 
From a technical viewpoint, the structure of a lattice L is obviously encoded into 
the order relation on irreducibles by the bijection XI + (J,,M,) (all x E L), since x is 
less or equal to y iff J, is a subset of JY (iff M, is a superset of M,); J,/\, = J, n JY 
and M.rv, = AI, n MJ hold in any (arbitrary) lattice, while JXVY is a superset of J, U J?, 
and MX~V is a superset of MY U M,. generallv (the eaualities hold for distributiw 
The CCl”3rlC3 30515 cf irzl cctlons 
Fig. 3. General lattice analysk and design 
lattices, which are isomorphic to set of subsets closed for union and intersection, and 
embeddable in Booiran lattices). These basic notions make explicit the &u/ interplay 
between binary relations and lattices (for more details, see [3. p. 124]), and explain how 
what can be said about “concepts” can be directly stated in terms of Lattice Theory. 
Hence, the upper drawing in Fig. 3 illustrates the mapping x/ + (J,,A4,) (all x t L): 
the lattice element denoted by E, which is pointed to by a cycle, is dominating the 
join-irreducible elements { D,X, y, z}, and is dominated by the meet-irreducibles { 1 J.6). 
The corresponding sub-table is indicated at the left-hand side, as a caption that is pasted 
into the drawing. 
Coming back to our present topic (and conversely to the lattice encoding), let R be a 
“concrete” relation defined as a subset of OxA that represents the description of a set 
of objects 0, by a set of attributes A:oRu is read ‘-the object o we&es the attribute a”, 
as well as, conversely “the attribute a applies to the object 0”. For a subset of attributes 
B C A, let B L= {o E OloRball b E B} define its ‘iextmsion”. which is the sets of all 
object to which B applies, and B JT= {a E AloRaall o E B 1) its “intmsion”, dually. 
The structure of Rc OxA is unfolded into the Gulois lattice L(R) = {(B L,B j,T)! all 
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subsets B of A}. It is sometimes useful to consider these maximal blocks (B L,B IT) 
of the relation R as concepts, the extension and intension of which consist of B J 
and B IT. Due to the previous remarks, the union of intensions is not always an 
intension, and the same applies to extensions (the contrary would force all lattices to 
be distributive). More formally, the meet and join operations of the Galois lattice L(R) 
are defined as 
and 
(BI>BIT)V(CLC1T) = ((BlT nClT) LVIT nClT>). 
In words, the meet operation (down, for defining lower bounds) corresponds to the 
intersection of extensions, while the join operation (going up in the lattice) corresponds 
to the intersection of intensions, dually. Calculating meets/joins can be done in Fig. 3. 
Lattices as implication models: For defining this second duality, let B C_ A be a subset 
of attributes, and let us also denote by B the conjunction of the properties “having the 
attributes b that B comprises”. Implications between conjunctions of attributes are 
defined by: B implies C, denoted by B + C, if B J, is a subset of C I, i.e. if all the 
objects having the conjunction of properties of B do have those of C as well. This is 
consistent with the common usage: conjunctions are just replaced by subsets of A for 
brevity. Now, some implications do not depend on the relation R and are simply the 
consequences of the propositional calculus: for instance, if B is a superset of C, then 
B + C holds, since B L must be a subset of C 1. Such implications can be read in the 
lattice, and express either ordering between attributes, or synonymies between complex 
conjunctions of attributes that make the observed Galois lattice smaller, so that there 
is a duality implicationsllattices: the more L(R) is far from being of the form 2 * *#A, 
the more there exist implications which reflect synonymies between conjunctions of 
attributes (i.e. which share the same extensions). 
It has been shown that all the implications holding in R can be inferred from a 
canonical basis (and that all basis have the same cardinality, see [21,57], which is 
non redundant for the following set of inference rules (which defines a restricted 
propositional calculus, without negation and contraposition): 
B+D isinferredfromB+C&C+D; 
B + C is inferred from C C B; 
BUX + CUX (all XCIA) are inferred from B-i C. 
This implications/lattices duality is of a fundamental nature for encoding interpretable 
information equivalent to the original data (up to the objects’ labels), for representing 
pragmatic implications between conjunctions of attributes (or conjunctions of objects). 
The duality implications/lattices is illustrated in the bottom drawing of Fig. 3. For 
drawing clarity, the lines parallel to the ones linking 5 and 6 to the lattice top have been 
erased (which resembles Wille’s [38] hnxi~y procedure). For instance, the implication 
16+5 can be checked in the table (all objects receiving 1 and 6 also receive 5) as 
well as in the lattice (the meet of I and 6 is below 5, and therefore captures it as a 
“new” meet-irreducible in the corresponding “intension”). 
4. Lattices cores and lattices of permutations 
To report now on a more algebraic direction of this work. after having rubbed 
shoulders with many a lattice coming from experimental designs, a natural question 
which comes to the surface is: Izonl can ,ve de$ne a bttice tninirnally.~ Of course, 
we already had the incident rrbtion hrt\vrm join and meet-irrrducihlr r1cwwnt.r. and 
the Galuis htticr construction. On the other hand, we had defined (see [21,57]) the 
canonical basis of implications, which is a kind of cunonical ,fhn for any c~lo.rr~t~~ 
oprrators, and can therefore be used to represent finite meet-semi-lattices, But these 
representations are “external” to the lattice structure (see also [ 10,35,36]); in the same 
direction of lattice representations, see also [9]. Hence the question could be refined 
as: honk can HY dt+ine u lattice in a minimal rcuy “internall~~“. in term of’ its .suh- 
.structures? For this, we needed the formalism of purtial semi-luttices (developed in 
[19,29,37]). 
The concept of meet-core of a (finite) lattice L, which is the minimal sub-structure 
out of which the lattice L can be re-generated by the meet operation, was introduced 
in [57,59], and leads to a generalization of G. Birkhoff s Theorem exhibiting any 
distrihutice Iuttice D as dually isomorphic to the ,filter luttice of its order of meet- 
irreducible elements (M(D), <). The meet-core consists in the union of the sets of 
meet-irreducible elements and of meet-essentiul elements which satisfy the technical 
condition recalled in Fig. 4. Unfortunately, for an arbitrary finite lattice, there will not 
be any local criterion for checking the property that an element x is meet-essential or 
not: you need the whole filter [x,1]. On the other hand, the meet-core is a subset of 
the scgfi~lding (see [37], and in general is smaller than the scaffolding in the case of a 
subdirectly irreducible luttice, since the scaffolding is then always equal to the lattice. 
In the case of modular lattices, such a local criterion exists, and the meet-core is 
equivalent to the well known base of lines (see [2,35,36] namely, an element is meet- 
essential if and only if the interval generated by its upper-covers is an M, (n 3 3 ). The 
top drawing of Fig. 4 thus represents the meet-core of the abstract lattice generated 
by the experimental design of Fig. 1. It is quite meaningful when we reinterpret it in 
the lattice of partitions (on the data set): we get a kind of “canonical form” of our 
experimental design by defining the order of meet-irreducible partitions and the Latin 
squares corresponding to the meet-essential partitions. For other classes of lattices, local 
conditions are quite tricky: the interested reader is referred to [57,59]. 
Permutations on a set play a prominent role in many fields of Mathematics, as well as 
more applied topics like Statistics, Data Analysis, Experimental Designs and Genetics. 
or kinship systems in Anthropology. The first property which is emphasized in every 
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Fig. 4. The meet-cores of lattices 
book, is that starting from any permutation 1 = ( 123 . .) on a set y1 = { 1,2,. . . , n}, 
any permutation can be obtained by a series of transpositions reversing neighbors. This 
gives rise to the symmetric group on an n element set. 
It was observed long ago in the context of Social Choice (see [l]) that the transpo- 
sitions also defines the cover relation of a lattice, which is denoted by Perm(n). If the 
group theoretic properties of permutations are well known, some lattice properties of 
Penn(n) are still not so clear (see [60]). The main results are recalled in Fig. 5, which 
aims at contributing to fill the gap and to the revival of interest in permutation lattices. 
The, quite messy top drawing of Fig. 5 is the first drawing which was obtained with 
GLAD, while the regular bottom drawing was obtained after a while, by embedding 
Perm(5) into a “pseudo product” of chains: 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5. 
The meet-core of Perm(n) is characterized, and meet-essential elements turn out to 
be locally characterized: it is shown that a permutation x is meet-essential in Perm(n) 
if and only if it has two covers a, b such that [x, a V b] is isomorphic to Perm(3). As 
a corollary, a permutation is meet-essential in Penn(n) if and only if it has exactly 
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two pairs of neighbors that are adjacent and not in alphabetic order. Hence, all the 
equalities between meet-expressions can be reconstructed in terms of adjacent pairs. 
More technical properties of Perm(n) can be explored, of which a lot are the con- 
sequence of its joinlmret-semidistributivity, for which the reader is referred to [60]. 
5. Representations, implications, abstraction 
Let us - in a neutral way - call Lattice Anu1ysi.s of dichotomic data all the proce- 
dures and technics which aim at analysing the structure of a given “observed” binary 
relation, by using the Galois lattices’ model, the canonical basis of implications and 
the properties described above, which are implemented in the program GLAD. 
As an example of output of Lattice Analysis, Fig. 6 (extracted from [64]) repre- 
sents the description, by eight global attributes, of around 3000 children which have 
been excluded from the French school system due to severe psychological or cerebral 
illnesses. The diseases I/K and C/P being exclusive by construction (respectively 
c.rrehruNnon-~erebrul palsy, neurosis/psychosis), it happens that nearly all the potential 
conjunctions are observed in that population, which is not that surprising considering 
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Fig. 6. Handicapped children excluded from school 
the size of the population compared to the small number of attributes. The bottom 
lattice is obtained from the top one by removing the intensions of which the exten- 
sions are small, namely less than 1% of the population (this threshold is arbitrary, 
and could be changed). In this “approximated cut” lattice, the attribute P (psychosis) 
does not associate with the somatic attributes (o, v, E, s), which is quite coherent with 
the basic observations in Psychiatry. In the top drawing of Fig. 6, the canonical 
basis of implications is nested into the boxed lattice. Only three implications are 
born by an intension which is a proper subset of attributes. All the other implica- 
tions point to counterexamples, since no patient has all the attributes. Hence, there 
are not many implications, in this example, out of those expressing the split between 
what is observed and what is not. Before commenting on further examples, we will 
focus for a while on the aims and methodology which are implicitly underlying Lattice 
Analysis. 
A first positive advantage of using Galois lattices to represent and analyse dichotomic 
data is to equally treat intentional and extensional interpretations, which are sent back 
to back by the underlying Galois correspondence. This possibility of using a re-unified 
language was called for by many precursors of the Philosophy of Science: 
Les deux interpretations logiques. II se presente meme une circonstance partic- 
ulierement intlressante: 1’Algebre en question est susceptible, en Logique meme, 
de deux interpretations distinctes, dont le parallelisme est presque parfait, sui- 
vant que les lettres representent des concepts ou des propositions. Sans doute. on 
peut, avec Boole et Schrdder, ramener ces deux interpretations a une seule, en 
considerant les concepts, d’une part, et les propositions, d’autre part, comme cor- 
respondant a des ensembles ou classes: un concept determine l’ensemble des objets 
auxquels iI s’applique (et qu’on nomme en Logique son extension); une proposi- 
tion determine l’ensemble des cas ou des instants du temps oti elle est vraie (et 
qu’on peut, par analogie, appeler aussi son extension); et alors le calcul des con- 
cepts et celui des propositions se reduisent a un seul.. (Couturat [7, p. 31) (5 ) 
Many systems have different names for properties and for the corresponding 
classes. This is discussed with respect to examples from the system of Principia 
Mathematics. Analysing these names by the method of extension and intension. 
we find that a name for the property Human and a different name for the class 
Human have not only the same extension but also the same intension. There- 
fore, the duplication of names to which the method of the name-relation leads is 
superfluous. (Catnap [44, p. 1061) 
Second, if the Galois machinery so cleverly assigns a symmetric role to the inten- 
sionaliextensional components of “concepts”, in order to extend our knowledge it is 
sometimes practical or necessary to take a much more oriented disymmrtric cim~ 
The notion of the extension of a concept, as the class of those objects to which 
the concept refers, is most often taken to be more transparent than that of in- 
tension, however sharply the medieval logicians conceived the distinction. Our 
proof-theoretic demystification of the intension of a concept, in terms of the class 
of those concepts which are logically derivable from the given concept, supplies 
a second definite pole, or axis, relative to which meaning may be conceived; lin- 
guistic axis for meaning which proves to be, in a surprisingly precise sense, dual 
to that of reference. The flexibility of this dualistic view of meaning as comprised 
of intensional and extensional components articulated such linguistic and referen- 
tial (in technical logical terminology, syntactical and semantical) poles, holds out 
sound promise as a tool for the elucidation of meaning in general, and, by laying 
sufficient stress on deduction, suggests an appropriate explanation of mathematical 
objectivity. (Castongay [45, p. 21) 
However, unanimity was not reached on the questions of abstraction. specially in 
the middle of this century when several controversies arose with other schools which 
even doubted the possibility of clarifying the intensional meaning of “concepts”. In 
particular: 
The purpose of this paper is to defend the thesis that the analysis of intension 
for a natural language is a scientific procedure, methodologically just as sound 
as the analysis of extension. To many linguists and philosophers this thesis will 
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appear as a truism. However, some contemporary philosophers, especially Quine 
and White believe that the pragmatical intension concepts are foggy, mysterious, 
and not really understandable, and that so far no explications for them have been 
given. (. . .) They emphasize that their objection against the intension concepts is 
based on a point of principle and not on the generally recognized facts of the 
technical difficulty of linguistic investigations, the inductive uncertainty, and the 
vagueness of the words of ordinary language. (Camap [44, p. 2361) 
By matching the intensions and extensions, Galois lattices provide a representation 
which avoids this doubling language, and therefore is in itself a reduction. To reduce 
a problem complexity is already an accomplishment, but more than providing a mere 
linguistic economy, avoiding this doubling aims at establishing the right conditions for 
mastering the dynamic of argumentation, by making use of either examples, or rules. 
L’esprit scientifique peut se fourvoyer en suivant deux tendances contraires: I’attrait 
du singulier et l’attrait de I’universel. Au niveau de la conceptualisation, nous 
definirons ces deux tendances comme caracteristiques d’une connaissance en 
comprehension et d’une connaissance en extension. (. . .) 11 faudrait creer ici un 
mot nouveau, entre comprehension et extension, pour designer cette activite de la 
pensee empirique inventive. 11 faudrait que ce mot put recevoir une acceptation 
dynamique particulitre. En effet, d’apres nous, la richesse d’un concept scientifique 
se mesure a sa puissance de deformation. Cette richesse ne peut s’attacher a un 
phenomene isole qui serait reconnu de plus en plus riche en caractbres, de plus 
en plus riche en comprehension. Cette richesse ne peut s’attacher davantage a une 
collection qui reunirait les phenomenes les plus heteroclites, qui s’ttendrait, d’une 
maniere contingente, a des cas nouveaux. La nuance intermediaire sera realisee si 
i’enrichissement en extension devient necessaire, aussi coordonnt que la richesse 
en comprehension. Pour englober des preuves experimentales nouvelles, il faudra 
alors deformer les concepts primitifs, Ctudier les conditions d’application de ces 
concepts et surtout incorporer les conditions d’application d’un concept dans le 
sens meme du concept. (Bachelard [43, p. 601) (6) 
Thus, seeking to formalize abstraction supposes a clear recognition of the intensioni 
extension duality giving priority to intensions, which is somehow a revival of original 
attitudes in the Philosophy of Science. For instance, the experts seem to agree that the 
fundamental turn in conceptualizing the duality intensionextension had been drawn by 
the Logique de Port Royal, at the end of the 17th century: 
En general la discussion sur les propositions simples et les propositions com- 
plexes, tout au long de la Grammaire et de la Logique de Port-Royal, suggere 
un concept d’idee ainsi entendu ; en effet, les propositions sont d&rites comme 
une combinaison d’idees, et on dit des id&es complexes qu’elles ont pour base 
les propositions constituantes sous-jacentes. En ce sens, le mot idle est un terme 
theorique appartenant a la theorie des pro& mentaux; la comprehension (c’est 
L dire l’intention ou la signification) d’un idee est la notion fondamentale pour 
I’interprttation skmantique, et dans la mesure oil l’on considkre que la structure 
profonde du langage est un reflet direct des pro&s mentaux, c’est aussi la notion 
fondamentale pour I’analyse de la pen&e (Chomsky [46, p. 661) (7) 
The same evaluation is also found in a book on Meunin<q und c~xistence ill Mtrtlw- 
/1lNti~‘.s: 
The Port Royal treatment of intension is also significantly original. The inter- 
conceptual relation which determines intension is enlarged far beyond the simple 
relation of genus to species, to encompass a more sophisticated logical organiza- 
tion of universals. The inclusion, in the intension of the idea of a triangle, of the 
fact that the sum of the angles of a triangle equals two right angles, involves the 
entire logical apparatus of Euclidean geometry in the determination of intension. 
This opening of the traditional doctrine to include more complex logical relations 
than mere predication in the determination of intensions, suggests the following 
evaluation of the Port Royal doctrine. (Castongay [45, p. IO]) 
With such deep roots in the Philosophy of Science, a third natural if more technical 
question is: how does Lattice Analysis cwnpure usith tditionu~ proc~~hres in Statistic’? 
All statistical methods commonly used in Behavioral and Social Sciences do not fall 
into linear methods such as Anulysk of Vuriunce, Fuctoriul Ana1vsi.r and the like. From 
the first development of Statistics, the distinction was even made between cwlurrtion 
proc~rl~r~~~s on numerical variables, and on the other hand countirlg pmwl~rws based 
on qualitative variables, often discrete. which are mathematically simpler: 
The quantitative character may arise in two different ways. In the first place. the 
observer may note only the presence or absence of some attribute in a series of 
objects or individuals, and count how many do or do not possess it. (. .) The 
quantitative character, in such cases, arises solely in the counting. In the second 
place, the observer may note or measure the actual magnitude of some variable 
character for each of the objects or individuals observed. (. .) The observations 
in these cases are quantitative ab initio. (. .) But the methods and principles 
developed for the case in which the observer only notes the presence or absence 
of attributes are the simplest and most fundamental, and are best considered first. 
(Yule and Kendall [39, p. 1 I]) 
Since they are more basic - if not more fundamental ~ . the discrete methods of 
which the dichotomic data are defined in terms of presence/absence of attributes off‘er 
the advantage of uroitling the ~~iifji’cdt rpwstions of’ u.L-ior7lLlti.~utiolz, which are en- 
countered with quantitatification, and the development of .Mrasurtv~wnt T/zeo~~~~. On 
the other hand. simpler mathematics do not mean simpler methods or even implistic 
conclusions: 
When it comes to detecting order in relatively well-structured domains, however, 
like kinship and social organisation, beliefs systems. economic exchange and ma- 
terial possessions, discrete methods like graph theory. Boolean algebra and lattice 
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analysis are very apt because they detect subtle structure and remain close to the 
raw data. (Schweizer [54, p. 2501) 
The fourth question concerns the old philosophical prohktn qf’ reduction: when- 
ever one considers a set of - concrete or abstract ~ objects, described in terms of pres- 
ence/absence of attributes, an immediate question which arises - all the more that dis- 
crete methods often explode combinatorially - is the question of reducing this descrip- 
tion by removing redundency as much as possible, and this both at the basic level of 
description of events, and at a more global level of construction of scientific theories: 
There are as a rule a number of ways in which the words used in a science can be 
defined in terms of a few among them. These few may have ostensive definitions, 
or may have nominal definitions in terms of words not belonging to the science 
in question (. . .). Such a set of initial words I call “minimum vocabulary” for 
the science in question, provided that (a) every other word used in the science 
has a nominal definition in terms of these words, and (b) no one of these initial 
words has a nominal definition in terms of the other initial words. Everything said 
in a science can be said by means of the words in a minimum vocabulary. For 
whenever a word occurs which has a nominal definition, we can substitute the 
defining phrase; if this contains words with a nominal definition, we can again 
substitute the defining phrase, and so on, until none of the remaining words have 
nominal definitions. In fact, definable terms are superfluous, and only undefined 
terms are indispensable. (Russell [52, p. 2591) 
Russel’s program aiming at the clarification of the basis of scientific disciplines by 
elimination of redundancy is driven essentially by syntactical attitude and procedures, 
which are natural and common in Mathematics. Lattice Analysis formalizes this syntac- 
tical reduction process precisely by pointing out the attributes (resp. objects) which are 
superfluous since their extension (resp. intension) can be expressed by intersection of 
others, so that the corresponding element is not meet-irreducible (resp. join-irreducible). 
See Fig. 3, where only 10 out of the 26 letters are join-irreducibles, the remaining 16 
being superfluous. However, it does not say anything about the choice of the basic 
attributes, which at the end of the reduction process turns out to become the unde- 
fined terms (axioms). For these definitions and choices, one cannot stay in the syntaxic 
side: 
Qu’une science soit consideree simplement comme un systeme d’affirmations ou 
comme une totalite de certaines affirmations et de certaines activites humaines, 
de toutes man&es l’ttude du langage scientifique constitue une partie essentielle 
de la discussion methodologique d’une science. (. .) La semantique du langage 
scientitique doit etre tout simplement in&se dans la methodologie de la science 
comme une de ses parties. (Tarski [33, p. 3001) (8) 
One of the potential duty of Lattice Analysis and discrete methods can be of help 
clarifying the basis of scientific disciplines, in offering syntactical tools in order to be 
in a better position to evaluate and refine their semantic, and this in using the available 
dualities ~lussrslpropositions, examnpleslc~ountere.~ar~lplrs, and extensionlintrnsion. 
Now, due to the potentially exponential unfolding of the binary relation into the 
Galois lattice, it remains a major question concerning Lattice Analysis - as well as 
other discrete methods - which is the need of developing approximation prowd~wc~.r. 
Thus, 
C’est la un fait philosophique general: l’analyse ne rend jamais raison de la 
synthese. (Bachelard [42, p. 1011) (9) 
Hence, in this spirit, eventually as the outcome of a process consisting of several back 
and forth interactions between the reality under study, the analy.sis, and theorrticul 
considerations, to be in a position to reduce the number of attributes, and thus to 
accept losing precision in the raw data, may appear as a fundamental prerequisite and 
goal of Lattice Analysis. This can be done in two ways: first, by refining the attributes’ 
definitions, it is often possible to eliminate unnecessary precision by recombining sev- 
eral attributes into a single one (via Boolean expression, for example). This a priori 
reduction is driven by the semantic of the domain, and should be done in narrow co- 
operation with the user and specialist of the domain. Second. as in Fig. 6, by applying 
some kind of threshold for cutting the original lattice, by a more syntactical and neutral 
procedure. This two kinds of reductions can obviously be combined together, as for 
the following example, of which the remaining I I attributes were obtained by recom- 
bination of the 23 original ones, which generated too large a lattice, quite difhcult to 
analyse. 
Fig. 7 (extracted from [66]) displays groups of patients which entered a psychiatric 
ward, described by I1 traits, for a small population of 30 subjects. Both drawings 
contain the implications t + r --7‘ q (which express troubles in mastering time). The 
top drawing displays the Galois lattice and the basis of implications of the raw data, 
while the other one the derived lattice, ,~@$wd by the extensions’ cardinalities (scaled 
in 10% of the population), which is obtained after applying a 10% cut approximution 
procedure. In this new lattice, “u” and “t” become superfluous, since they are pushed 
to the bottom and are no longer meet-irreducible elements. Without entering too much 
into the data interpretations, this approximation confirms the scaling in three levels of 
troubles in mastering time, and at the top, the existence of two groups of attributes 
that do not associate together (encircled by ellipses in the bottom drawing). 
Such orders of attributes/Galois lattices will be used to reduce the complexity of 
the conceptual field born by all these groups, and to abstract approximate implications 
(dependencies, rules) between attributes. The weighed lattice can be interpreted as 
the union of all the cumulated distrihutiorzs along the maximal chains between the 
lattice top and bottom. In order for Lattice Analysis to become a standard statistical 
method and not only a representation of the data, it should be grafted together with 
approximation procedures and more sophisticated threshold methods. Such a program 
intails specific difficulties: to construct a Galois lattice from a table with M attributes 
requires at most to scan through 2” ~ eventually with drastic shortcuts; to extract from 
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Fig. 7. Psychiatric diseases of a group of patients 
this raw lattice a “nice” derived sub-structure requires to scan through eventually 22”, 
which is at another scale. 
Fig. 8 represents the description of social practices by r~ords, concerning the treat- 
ment of poverty in New York city, at the end of past century (extracted from Mohr and 
Duquenne [27]). The lattice is “nearly” distributive (when removing only four elements: 
between gives and investg, home Wk), and therefore generates splitting practice/word 
pairswhenever a pair p/w of practicelword is such that both are irreducible and that 
p is the lower practice not below w while w is the higher word not above p in the 
lattice, the pair p/w is said to be perspective. For instance, the pair foodlFALLEN 
is perspective. When a lattice is distributive, there is an exact matching between the 
join- and meet-irreducible elements, each of these matching pair being perspective (and 
there is not any other perspectivity relationship), and each matching pair expresses a 
local negation (p is the complement of w in the interval that they generate) and an 
exclusive union: a block (practices, words) in the lattice is either above p or below 
w, but not both. 
The distributive interval above shelter, in Fig. 8 is built on the following list of 
splitting pairs: paidWklNEED Y, investglDESTITUTE, aduiselINDIGENT, ,jind Job1 
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Fig. 8. The Galois lattice ‘practices x words’ ( 188X) 
WORTHY, give$lHOMELESS, ji?odlFALLEN, and finally usylumlSTRANGER. 
These splits must be interpreted in connection with the order relationships between 
practices and words: hence, NEEDY applies to all the practices implied by paidW 
(usylum, jbod, shelter) but itself, and is therefore characteristic of not getting only 
puidWk but food or cover. When STRANGER applies, it cannot be to an us~lum but 
a shelter; and when FALLEN applies, it is not to food but to shelter. For HOME- 
LESS, give$ doesn’t apply, but eventually ,food shelter, usylum, jindJoh, or puidwk. 
Fig. 9 illustrates another example (extracted from Schweizer [53], see also [62] ). 
The possessions of 98 Javanese peasants have been described into 27 binary attributes 
as part of an anthropological research project on Mutrriul Culture. Lattice Analysis 
has been used on this set of “raw” data in order to assess the connection between 
people and possessions, to summarize the main co-occurrences of possessions, and to 
try to decipher the class structure of this village. Three local analyses have been done, 
focusing on the attributes defining housing, livestock and ,fhrniture. Housing alone 
gives limited information, livestock shows highly non-symmetrical associations, while 
the Jiwnittrre structures the peasants along “regular” blocks that are linearly ordered 
along the implications: television + muttress 4 hiq~cie. 
Most interesting in Fig. 9 is that the global analysis also shows the population as 
being ordered along regular blocks that are characterized by housing only: hence, the 
class structure is assessed by ownership, uccess to \i’uter (well), and the six of’ the 
houses, even if livestock and jiwnituw refine this global ordered class stratification. 
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Fig. 9. Ungluing decomposition in regular blocks 
These provisional conclusions should be enriched by the anthropological knowledge of 
the experts, taking an extensional look and coming back to the peasant descriptions. 
To conclude this section, let us quote a glad user of Lattice Analysis with whom 
this analysis was developed, in an essay on Discrete Structures in the Social Sciences, 
which tried to evaluate precisely what may be gained by using it in Anthropology: 
What do we gain by applying lattice analysis to material possession data? Data 
on material possessions are intrinsically meaningful for studying the fundamental 
organizational principles and the basic scaffolding of societies. At the heart of 
material possessions data are logical implications (what is associated with what?) 
and the notion of dual ordering: what can we infer from the possessions data on 
the ordering of actors as well as the ordering of things? (. . .) This visualization of 
often complex data enables deeper understanding of the inherent ordering pattern 
and provides a spur to ethnographic interpretation. (Schweizer [53, p. 271) 
In a sense this discrete movement takes up the gist of older structuralisms in 
the social sciences, but structural analysis of today studies orderings in empirical 
data by using precise methods, newly implemented computer programs and thus 
avoids the flaws of its predecessors. (Schweizer [53, p. 41) 
6. Conclusion 
Since Descartes, Human beings have been thought of as a “geometrical animal”, and 
scientific literature has been affected by this geometrical shift. In the present case of 
the use of Latticial Structures in Data Analysis, notice how it accomplishes a circular 
return to the initial motivations of a precursor of Lattice Theory such as G. Boole: 
Au total, l’kmergence d’un point de vue algkbrique. objectif du mouvement de 
1’Ecole analytique anglaise, devait se faire contre une tradition de g&om6trismc, et 
c’est dans les termes de cette opposition kgalement que se traduit la question nota- 
tionnelle. (. .) Cette affirmation de l’autonomie des methodes purement analytiques 
de r&solution de problimes est le point de d&part d’une v&table philosophie du 
symbolisme. d’une rkfiexion pousst-e sur ce que signifie raisonner dans les signes. 
et sur la diffirence entre les symboles algkbriques et les figures g&om&riques. 
(Diagne [47. p. 781) (10) 
If Boole implicitly conceived his lattices to reason on formulas, using Galois lat- 
tices, for example in the Social Sciences, can now be done in order to bc in a 
position to represent and understand the social structures. With this inversion, one 
joins the viewpoints of another great logician and mathematician of the past century, 
C.S. Peirce: 
Ce qui distingue rt-ellement les mathkmatiques [selon Peirce] ce n’est pas leur 
objet% mais leur methode, “qui consiste j ktudier des constructions ou diagrammes”. 
“Que telle soit bien la methode des mathkmatiques, ajoute-t-il. est sans aucun 
doute correct; car mgme en algttbre le but du symbolisme cst de mettre sous les 
yeux de I’esprit une reprksentation schkmatique des relations mises cn cause dans 
le probl&me. qui pourra etre 6tudit;e comme on 6tudie une figure gkom&riquc”. 
(J.Chenu in Peirce [50, p. 661) (1 1 ) 
G. Bachelard goes further when he argues that a drawing can be more than a usc- 
ful tool. it can acquire the status of a conceptual interface linking concrete/abstract 
levels: 
Rendre gCom6trique la reprksentation. c’est j dire dessiner les ph&om&cs et or- 
donner en s&ie les kvirnements dtcisifs d’une exptrience, voilh la t&he premiCrc 
oh s’afirme I’esprit scientifique. C“est en effet de cette maniire qu’on arrive a 
la quantitt figurke, i mi-chemin entre le concret et I’abstrait, dans une zone in- 
termkdiaire ori l’esprit p&end concilier les mathkmatiques et l’expkrience, les lois 
et les fairs. (Bachelard [43, p. 51) (12) 
The lattices which have been generated from real observations ~ as in Fig. 6 
and after - “put under the mind’s eyes” all the relationships between the groups of 
patients that share the same conjunctions of attributes. Such representations should not 
be ultimate statements, but some kind of frames on which thinking can be fixed. By 
comparing sub-structures, by checking the attributes associations, the groups’ cardina- 
lities. Then. Galois lattices acquire the beginning of an existence as technical tools. 
Hence, the questions which have been treated here about Latticial Structures in Data 
Analysis are operating in the contact area between observational and experimental 
disciplines on the one hand, and Mathematics on the other and in so doing there is an 
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exchange. What are the relationships between these worlds that rarely meet? What are 
the needs of exchanges between them? The expressed needs of interactions? 
Contrairement aux opinions du sens commun, il est done beaucoup plus diffi- 
tile de constater des faits et de les analyser que de reflechir ou de deduire, et 
c’est pourquoi les sciences experimentales sont nees bien apres les disciplines 
dtductives, celles-ci constituant a la fois le cadre et la condition necessaires de 
celles-la, mais nullement suffisants. (Piaget [51, p. 991) (13) 
La connaissance scientifique comporte deux modes fondamentaux: I’interpretation 
experimentale et la deduction algorithmique, pouvant d’ailleurs Ctre tous deux 
selon les cas plus ou moins statiques ou dialectiques. En un mot, les sciences 
supposent des faits et des normes, et elles se chargent de decouvrir ou d’elaborer 
les deux. (Piaget [51, p. 1531) (14) 
The “historical gap” and the specific difficulties of the Natural Sciences do not imply 
in turn the absence of results. on the contrary. Facing the extraordinary explosion of 
the Natural Sciences, F. Engels already fixed as an urgent goal, last century, to order 
and formalize their numerous achievements. This is still a challenging program today. 
L’etude empirique de la nature a accumule une masse si enorme de connais- 
sances positives que la necessite de les ordonner systematiquement et selon leur 
enchainement interne dans chaque domaine de recherche &part est devenue ab- 
solument imperieuse. (. . .) Mais la science de la nature, ce faisant, se transporte 
dans le domaine de la theorie et ici les methodes empiriques echouent, la pensee 
theorique peut seule servir. (Engels [48, p. 491) (15) 
Now, if Mathematics and Logic have an autonomous development through their ex- 
changes with the Natural Sciences, is this exchange fair and symmetric? Is there any re- 
lationship of domination or conquest, in a relationship of exteriority? Any 
hierarchy? 
Mais le rapport des mathematiques aux sciences de la nature n’est pas a sens 
unique. (. . .) Tout se passe comme si les mathematiques rendaient aux sciences, 
sous une forme &labor&e, ce qu’elles ont recu d’elles. Dans cet Cchange organique, 
a-t-on encore le droit de parler d’application ? Ne doit-on pas parler un autre 
langage, et dire qu’il existe entre les mathematiques et les sciences de la nature 
un autre rapport, un rapport de constitution - les mathematiques n’etant ni un 
outil, ni un instrument, ni une mtthode, ni un langage au service des sciences, 
mais partie prenante a leur existence, a leur constitution ? (Althusser [40, p. 321) 
(16) 
This position could be more widespread and shared among mathematicians, experi- 
menters and other scientists, when they are pained by their efforts to communicate. 
Reaching now the conclusion of this discussion, and comforted by all these view- 
points of the literature of the Philosophy of Sciences, we are now in a better position 
to try making the initial thesis more precise, in claiming the following re-stucturalist 
thesis: Lattices are natural and fundunzmtal starctutw ,t,hich ure mnstitutiw of 
any attempt to describe and unalysr data from the Natural. Brhat’iorul und Swiul 
Sciences, md this, either in the direction qf experimental drsiqns. or of ohscwrrtiot~ul 
dichotonlic datu, due to their ahilitJ> to encode dualities. und to /war both thouyht 
and cafcL~Ius. Moreover, in reaction to a spreading wave of neutralism in the face of 
data, we also subscribe to the following complementary precision: 
Le donne est relatif a la culture, il est necessairement implique dans une con- 
struction. (. .) II faut qu’un donni soit recu. Jamais on n’arrivera a dissocier 
complttement I’ordre du don& et la methode de sa description non plus qu’a 
les confondre I’un dans I’autre. I1 y a entre ces deux termes ~~ qui representent 
pour nous l’opposition minima de l-esprit et du reel ~~ des reactions constantes qui 
soulevent des resonances reciproqucs. (Bachelard 142, p. 141) ( 17) 
Following this position, Lattice Analysis would not be established as an autonomous 
discipline, developing specific vocabulary and folklore, but should stay as a coordinated 
family of analysis practices, preserving carefully its roots in Mathematics as well as in 
the kernel of the disciplines with which it can be applied and further developed. 
Appendix. Translations of the quotations 
[These tmmslutions ure qivrn ,fbr the conctwirnce of’ the Eqlish spcwking ~wrd~~r. 
They ure nearly Ycord jbr word” trunscriptiom of‘ the oriyinul Frnwh quoters. us 
neutral us is hopejidly possihlr. ] 
I. Whatever be the starting point of the scientific activity, this activity can be fully 
convincing only by leaving its basic domain: if it experiments. one has to reason. if it 
reasons, one has to experiment. 
2. Following Dedekind, a great number of contemporary researchers ~ MM Birkhoff. 
Von Neumann, Glivenko, Ore and others - have built a general theory of structures (En- 
glish authors call them lattices, networks) which comprise set theory, number theory. 
projective geometry, ca.mbinatorial topology, probability theory, mathematical logic. 
functional spaces, etc . . . (. . .) The general theory of structures lays on the possibility 
to structure along two inverse ways a same set, and this is for us a result of philosoph- 
ical importance to see this inner duality of two antisymmetric beings/things [etres]. that 
can be distinguished in the core of a same being. which forms the generative principle 
of a huge gathering of mathematical realities. 
3. On the other hand, it appears that the authors could without any inconvenience 
have omitted the chapter on lattices, to which an important American school pays 
a persistent attention, despite the least interest that this theory provides in the other 
branches of mathematics. 
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4. At first sight, it seems that the purpose of propositional calculus and projective 
geometry are distinct, although the logical structures of these two topics have a lot 
of analogies. The meaning of these analogies appeared only in very recent researches 
within the new domain of abstract algebra. 
5. The two logical interpretations. One circumstance even appears to be particularly 
interesting: this algebra can receive two distinct interpretations in logic, of which the 
parallelism is nearly perfect, whether the letters represent either concepts or proposi- 
tions. With no doubt it is possible to follow Boole and Schroder in bringing back these 
two interpretations to only one, by considering the concepts, on the one hand, and the 
propositions, on the other hand, as corresponding to sets or classes: one concept de- 
termines the set of objects to which it applies (which is called its extension in logic); 
one proposition determines the set of cases or of moments in time where it is true 
(which could analogously be called its extension); then, the calculus of concepts and 
the calculus of propositions reduce to only one.. 
6. The scientific mind can be wrong in following two contradictory tendencies: at- 
traction for singularity and attraction for the universal. At the level of conceptualisation, 
we will define these two tendencies as characteristic of a knowledge in comprehen- 
sion and a knowledge in extension. (. . .) Here it would be necessary to coin a new 
word, between comprehension and extension, to point out this activity of the inventive 
scientific mind. It would be necessary that this word received a particular dynamic 
acceptation. Indeed, we think that the richness of scientific concept is weighed by 
its power of distortion [deformation]. These potentialities cannot be attached to an iso- 
lated phenomenon which would be recognized richer and richer in features [caracteres], 
richer and richer in comprehension. This richness can neither be attached to a collec- 
tion that would put together heterogeneous phenomenon, which would spread to new 
cases in a contingent way. The intermediary refinement will be made real [realise] if 
the refinement in extension becomes necessary, as coordinated as the refinement in 
comprehension. To comprise new experimental proofs, it will then be necessary to 
distort primitive concepts, to study their conditions of application, but essentially for 
incorporating these conditions of application within the very meaning of the concept. 
7. In general, the discussion of simple and complex propositions throughout the 
Port Royal grammar and logic suggests this concept of “idea”, since propositions are 
described as formed by combining ideas, and complex ideas are described as based on 
underlying constituent propositions. In this sense, “idea” is a theoretical term of the 
theory of mental processes; the comprehension (i.e., intension or meaning) of an idea 
is the fundamental notion in semantic interpretation, and in so far as the deep structure 
of language is regarded as a direct reflection of a mental process, it is the fundamental 
notion in the analysis of thought. 
8. Independent of whether a science is conceived merely as a system of statements or 
as a totality of certain statements and human activities, the study of scientific language 
constitutes an essential part of the methodological discussion of a science. (. , .) The 
semantics of scientific language should be simply included as a part in the methodology 
of sciences. 
1;. Duquenne I Theoretiul Computer Sciencr 217 i 1909) 407436 133 
9. This is a general philosophical fact: analysis never renders/gives satisfaction [rend 
raison] for synthesis. 
10. All in all, the emergency of an objective analytical viewpoint of the analytical 
English school would have to be done against a geometrical tradition, and this is in 
the terms of this opposition that the question of denotation can be translated. (. .) This 
claim of the autonomy of purely analytical methods for solving problems is the starting 
point of a real philosophy of symbolism, with a thorough reflection on what reasoning 
on signs means, and on the distinction between algebraic symbols and geometrical 
figures. 
I I. What really distinguishes mathematics (following Peirce) is not their objects, 
but their methods “which consist in studying constructions and diagrams”. “That this 
consists in the very method of mathematics - he adds ~ is with no doubt correct, since 
even in algebra the aim of symbolism is to display a schematic representation of the 
relationships at stake in a problem in the face of the mind’s eyes, which can be studied 
as a geometrical figure can be”. 
12. To render geometric the representation, which is to say to draw the phenomenon 
and to order the decisive events of an experiment in series, here is the first task 
where the scientific mind asserts oneself. This is indeed by this way that one reaches 
the represented quantity [quantitt figurle], in between the concrete and the abstract, 
in an intermediary area where the mind pretends to conciliate mathematics and the 
experiments, laws and facts. 
13. Contrary to the commonsense opinions, it is therefore more difficult to ascertain 
facts and to analyze them as compared with to think or to deduct, and here is why 
experimental sciences were born long after deductive disciplines, the former consisting 
in the frame and necessary conditions of the former, but not sufficient. 
14. Scientific knowledge comprises two fundamental modes: experimental interpre- 
tation and algorithmic deduction, which by the way can be more or less static or 
dialectic, depending on the circumstances. In one word, the sciences suppose facts and 
norms, and they undertake to discover and elaborate both. 
15. The empirical study of nature has accumulated such an enormous mass of positive 
knowledge that the necessity to order them systematically and along their internal links 
within the scope of each separated research domain has become a pressing absolute 
necessity. (. . .) But, so doing, the science of nature moves into the domain of theory. 
and at this point, empirical methods fail, only theoretical thinking can be helpful. 
16. But the relation between mathematics and the sciences of nature is not one way. 
(. .) It happens to be like if mathematics gave back to sciences what they got from 
them, in an elaborate way. With this organic exchange, can one still speak of appli- 
cation’? Shouldn’t one speak another language, and say that another relationship exists 
between mathematics and the sciences of nature, a constitutive relationship, mathemat- 
ics being neither a tool, nor an instrument, nor a method, nor a language at the service 
of the sciences, but taking part into their existence, into their constitution’? 
17. A datum [don&] is relative to culture, it is necessarily involved into a con- 
struction. (. .) A datum must be received. One will never succeed either in completely 
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dissociating the order of a datum from the method for describing it, or in assimilating 
them. There are between these two terms -which for us represent the minimal opposi- 
tion between the mind and reality- permanent reactions that rise mutual resonances. 
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